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PREFACE 
The results of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, the continuous debates in the 
national and in the European parliaments and, consequently, the new wave of political parties 
that are more consecrated to their “populus” have helped the populism to rise and to become 
one of the most discussed theme in the European Union; the results of the recent European 
elections though, defused it since the populist parties still represent a minority in the 
Eurozone but surely it can be said that they are facing an unprecedented rise and are obtaining 
more and more consensus among the people, making it a central theme of discussion. 
The abundance of information about such theme, the continuous debates, its evolution and its 
dynamics have brought this argument to my attention and I was interested in finding more 
about this topic; trying to understand if a possible economic connection could be provided for 
the populism phenomenon was surely stimulating, also because it represented something 
different with respect to my classic studies. 
The final aim of this thesis is to try to provide an economic explanation to the rise of 
populism, try to understand if economic variables can be utilized in order to predict it, to see 
if they can be considered as objects of interest in order to explain such actual and complex 
phenomenon. 
I would like to thank my mentor Professor Nicolò Antonio, Professor Bertoni Marco, who 
gave me an enormous help with the empirical part, my girlfriend Silvia for her constant 
support and everyone else who has patiently waited for me to conclude my studies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
The title of this thesis, “Populism and democracy: an economic perspective” explains the final 
aim of this study, that is the provision of an explanation to the complex phenomenon that is 
populism; it aims to focus on an economic interpretation of populism rise by looking at the 
other works in the literature and by adding its own piece of analysis during the empirical part 
in order to reach this result. 
The thesis is divided into three main chapters where the topics are discussed from different 
points of view; the first chapter introduces the concept of populism, it provides a definition 
for such phenomenon and it describes the different elements that characterize it, it describes 
the main differences between the populism presents in Latin America and the one in Europe 
as well as for the differences between the left-wing and the right-wing populism. It continues 
with a specification of the supply side and the demand side of populism with the description 
of the variables that play a role in these two sides and, finally, it presents an explanation, 
based on the review of the literature, to the rise of populism , explained at the light of 
different perspectives, from the crisis of the democracy to the cultural backlash thesis, from 
the Durkheimian approach to the Downsian approach. 
The second chapter is entirely focused on the economic determinants of populism; it is based 
on a review of the literature in order to consider what was already discussed but compared 
with different economic factors such as the economic insecurity, the globalization (and its 
multiple faces), the frustration and the relocation effect, the policy strait jacket and the 
unemployment rate. From this chapter it is possible to understand that populism is an 
extremely complex phenomenon and it can’t be described in simple terms since there are a 
multitude of factors, both economic and not economic, that are involved. 
The last chapter represents the empirical part of the thesis with an analysis done in order to 
find an economic connection between the rise of populism (measured, in this case, as the 
lower trust toward the European Union) and an economic indicator of inequality, the Gini 
index, a relationship that, according to the hypothesis, is expected to be negative; the chapter 
provides such analysis and it continues by adding dummy and control variables to the model 
in order to provide more robustness and in order to have a better fit. It is found that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the Gini index and the trust toward the 
European Union, a result that confirms the initial hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a 
brief description of the limitations of the analysis and of the study and a brief summary about 
the results and the final thoughts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Was it possible to detect a common trend during the political elections in Europe in the latest 
years? Is it possible to see that the resentment against the EU is the common factor for such 
new situation? 
The latest years were characterized by the uprising of new players in the political arena, 
namely the populist parties. The rise of populist parties was progressive and very robust and 
today, in 2019, they occupy a considerable percentage of share in the political arena; these 
examples in Europe can be found in the results of the recent European elections with the 
winning in Italy of Matteo Salvini’s “La Lega” with the 34% of the total preferences, 
(Horowitz J., 2019) with the Brexit party created a few months before the European elections 
which obtained the 30,5% of preferences in Britain and with the Front National in France 
which gained the 23.31% of the preferences, just to quote a few examples. 
Populism is a phenomenon which can be analysed on many dimensions, on the political side 
because of the presence of a physical party in the political arena and on the economic, social 
and cultural side because of their policies and their programs. The economics of populism, as 
it is intended in this paper, is concerned with the proposal of economic reforms that are 
inefficient in the long period and that are characterized by an aspect of “the people vs the 
elite”; the economic reforms proposed by the populist parties include also the concealment of 
the cost that will be sustained by the next generation of politics. 
Populism is a phenomenon that can be found in the European Union but, historically, it 
obtained its greatest importance in Latin America in which different States were and are 
administered by governments entirely formed by populist parties or by leaders such as Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela and Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina just to cite a few. 
The form of populism in Latin America, which is different from the one in Europe (as we will 
see later in this document), is mainly characterized by the objective to overcome the fiscal 
crisis with the reduction on the internal and foreign public debt trying to spare the flourishing 
sectors of the economy from sacrifices. 
Historically, the different populist regimes in Latin America, have experienced such phases 
during their intervention: 
-Phase 1: where their macroeconomics policies were successful, with many controls posed on 
the inflation, a phase characterized by a growth of the output, real wages and employment 
rates and with demand expansion and low level of inventory; 
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-Phase 2: it runs in bottleneck as a result of the internal growth of the demand and a lack of 
foreign exchange; now the low level of inventories became a serious problem and price 
realignment and devaluation becomes necessary, inflation rises but the wages rise 
proportionally; 
-Phase 3: the inflation rises rapidly, the foreign exchange gap leads to the demonetization of 
the economy, the budget deficit deteriorates because of a decline in the tax collection and of 
the increase in the subsidy costs with the result of a fall of the real wages and the instability of 
the policies adopted; 
-Phase 4: a stabilization happens under a new government, usually with the enabling of an 
IMF procedure resulting in the real wages at a significantly lower level than the beginning of 
the experience; the fall of the real wages happens because of the relocation of capitals. 
(Edward S., Dornbusch R., 1990) 
The most common findings of such experiences of populism resulted not in a total collapse of 
the economy but the progressive deterioration of the living conditions of the social classes 
supposed to be the beneficiaries of the populist reforms. 
The rise of populism in Europe has reached it exploit in the current years during the European 
election where the populist parties throughout the Continent obtained a consistent percentage 
of voting shares as we have said before; despite this progressive rise the populist parties 
weren’t able to conquer the vast majority of the European seats because circa the 75% of the 
voters still support the EU but their increasing power and presence can’t be denied. 
The common lines of these populist parties are formed by the support to anti-immigration 
policies, the promotion of nationalism, the blaming of globalization and the promise to return 
to a precedent era (Horowitz J., 2019); the actual political arena of the European union is 
changing, shifting from a classic right-wing and left-wing dualism to a populist and non-
populist dualism. 
The European union was in a state of turmoil since the financial crisis of 2008 which 
increased the social and economic inequalities and brought additional division within the 
Continent, between the north and the south, the rich and the poor, a situation which was 
severely worsened by the immigration crisis which exploded in 2015. The combination of 
these factors contributed to the rise of such populist parties which, progressively, were able to 
gain more and more importance in the political arena. 
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One of the most recognizable example of their increasing importance in the European Union 
can be found in the winning of the 2016 referendum in UK, which leads to the Brexit case; 
according to a study conducted by the Guardian in November 2018, in Europe one in four 
European votes populist. (Barr C., et al., 2018). 
Populist parties enjoyed success in Norway, Switzerland and Italy in the 1990s, but we have 
to wait until the turn of the century to see a real proliferation of the populist side, from the 
Netherlands to France, Hungary to Poland. 
The anti-austerity Syriza took 27% of the vote and then 36% in the successive Greek elections 
as a consequence against the austerity policies imposed by the European union; Ukip, as we 
have already said, lead Britain to its Brexit vote and Marine Le Pen during the latest 
presidential election in France, obtained the 33% of the votes. (Barr C., et al., 2018) 
The financial crisis that started in 2008 created room for populism in the countries in which 
the population suffered the most from such financial distress; the case of Italy and Greece 
suggested so. In Italy, with the rising inequality and the higher unemployment rate in an 
already distressed situation, and in Greece , with the profound crisis of the sovereign debt, 
there were the strict austerity policies imposed by the European Union; these countries can be 
considered as an example because the results obtained by the populist parties in such States 
can be seen as a sign of revolt against the EU. (Blyth M., Hopkin J., 2018) 
Populism, consequently, is a complex, multi-faced problem which cannot be described in only 
one dimensions; surely there are many factors that can provide a useful interpretation for such 
result and the economic variable should be considered as one of the most, if not the most, 
important factor to describe the rise of such phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 DEFINITION 
Provide a definition to the concept of populism is extremely difficult and complex; this term 
can be used in different context and the definition will vary accordingly; the term derives 
from the Latin word Populus and it refers to the accurate and fast serving of the popular 
needs. In a social science context Populism can refer to the common practice of the policy 
makers to follow the short-term popularity and pressure of the population with no regards of 
the long-term objectives and values that should be considered as fundamental factors for a 
policy-makers. (Csaba L., 2008) 
The most common utilized and known definition of populism was provided by the political 
analyst Cas Mudde in 2004 who defined it as  
“a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”. 
(Mudde C., 2011) 
The definition provided by Cas Mudde shows some useful characteristic that can be used in 
order to describe briefly the idea of populism: 
- the division of the society in two groups, the rich elite and the “normal” people; 
- the situation of conflict between the two mentioned groups where the people try to 
fight against the system ruled by the elite; 
- the idea of the re-acquisition of the sovereignty, considered to be vanished throughout 
the years because of the government imposed by the elite; 
- the idea that with the re-acquisition of the sovereignty by the people there will be 
finally a true democracy and a true expression of the will of the people.  
The focal point of populism, as we can see, is the Popolus itself, which is considered as a 
social group which has seen its power and its rights vanished throughout the years because of 
the presence of a strong elite which, with the use of intermediaries, foreclose the people the 
possibility to really possess the key to their decision and to their sovereignty. (Kriesi H., 
Pappas T.S., 2015)  
The antagonistic characteristic  that was mentioned before can be considered on a symbolic 
view because the concept itself provided by Cas Mudde refers implicitly to the elite as the 
“corrupt” group and to the people as the “poor, the suppressed” group, a division which is 
7 
 
particularly important if we move along the concept of exclusion/inclusion; the antagonistic 
characteristic of such categories make the belonging to one of this group an implicit exclusion 
from the other one. (Kaltwasser C.R., Mudde C., 2013) 
If we want to consider another definition of populism, we can cite the one provided by Kurt 
Weyland who defines populism as 
“a political strategy through which a personalist leader seeks, or exercise 
government power based on direct, unmediated, un-institutionalized support from 
large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Mudde C., 2011); 
 this definition, even if different in certain aspect from the one provided by Cas Mudde 
present an important point in common, the concept of a “direct, un-institutionalized power”. 
 1.2 THE ELEMENTS OF POPULISM 
The broad view of populism encompasses some characteristics that help creating a framework 
for its general description: following the concept of economics of populism that it is utilized 
for this study (ed. p.2), we can describe some relevant economic factors: 
-initial conditions: the populist leaders focus their attention on the economic indicators, they 
have a dissatisfied behaviour toward the results and the policies adopted by the current 
administration (the so-called elite); they strongly believe that by following the idea of 
populism (that is, the re-acquisition of the sovereignty) the performances would be better; 
- no constraints: their vision considers as totally negative the presence of any type of 
constraints with regard to the macroeconomic policies and the economic reforms adopted by 
their country; they believe that the removal of these barriers would create a growth trend in 
the economy;  
-policy prescriptions: consequent to what it has been said before the main points of populism 
are the redistribution of the income, the reactivation and the reconstruction of the economy of 
the country. An example of these points might be the increase in the real-wages without a 
consequent increase in the prices of the product; the reconstruction of the economy is done in 
order to save on foreign exchange and to sustain the increase in the real-wages. (Edward S., 
Dornbusch R., 1990) 
Moving on with the other characteristics of populism that we can find in the definition of 
Mudde (ed. Ch.1, p.6) it is worth citing the democratic idea of representation; according to the 
populist vision, the policy-makers should have a direct connection with the people without the 
presence of any type of intermediaries, a form that can be described as an immediate identity 
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between the ruler and the people which resolves in an immediate form of representation or, 
even more precise, and embodiment where the policy-makers can give voice to the will of the 
individuals. Another important characteristic which is directly linked to the one above 
mentioned, is the general will of the people; public opinion for a populist party is vital and the 
consensus or the reactions should be monitored through opinion pools. (Abts K., Rummens 
S., 2007) Populism is a very complex concept which also include factors such as the anti-
establishment, authoritarianism and nativism which describe in different ways the already 
cited antagonism against the elite and the current financial, political and economic 
institutions. (Inglehart R.F., Norris P., 2016) 
1.3 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND IN LATIN AMERICA: THE MAIN 
DIFFERENCES 
With the phenomenon of populism an important differentiation has to be done between the 
populism typical of Latin America and the populism typical of the European Countries. They 
both start with the central importance given to the people, seen as the true and legitimate 
source of political power but they still present some differences.  
First of all, populism is different from the point of view of its relative importance; in Latin 
America populist parties are chosen by the majority of the population during the election 
pools while in Europe the populist parties obtain, despite their growth, only a small 
percentage of the overall share of votes (Mudde C., 2011). Another major difference between 
these two visions of populism can be seen in the main focus of the populist policies; the Latin 
American populism puts its attention on the economy while the European populism is focused 
more on the national identity. The populism in Latin America, by focusing its policies on the 
economy, is characterized by: the attempt to operate a redistribution of the income, 
government spending on job policies, the reduction of the inflation risk and the deficit 
finance. (Mudde C., 2011). Even if the programs effectively done by the various governments 
were different on many points the convergence in the form of Latin America populism is 
found in the opposition and the negativity toward the neoliberal economy. 
The concept of economics of populism in Europe instead, is mainly focused on the 
privatization, the deprivation of power from the political parties or associations, the reduction 
of importance of the interest groups and of the intermediaries between the people and the 
policy-makers. Here we can still find a negative behaviour toward the neoliberal economics 
because of the strong nationalism effects embedded within the different States of the 
European Union; the neoliberal economy is seen as a threat, a potential entry structure for 
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foreign dominant countries and, consequently, the nationalism and the populism wing are 
committed to fight against such menace. 
The phenomenon of populism in Europe is related with the national identity of the countries 
with the distinction between two categories, the “natives” and the “aliens”; this results in a 
dynamic of favouring policies for the ingroup (the natives) and doing propaganda against the 
outgroup (the aliens) which can be considered as the ethnic minorities, the immigrants, the 
foreigners and the refugees. (Mudde C., 2011) 
The concept of identity, instead, is different in Latin America since there isn’t a pure national 
identity in its different States; these States are formed by a continuous interaction of cultures, 
between themselves and between them and the European countries, and, consequently, the 
phenomenon of determine a national identity is less strong. The result of this dissimilarity can 
be found in the different nature of populism which is mainly present is these two worlds since 
in Latin America there is a populism inclined to the left-wing side while, in Europe, the 
various populist parties are mainly on the right-wing side. The focus of Latin American 
populism, with respect to the concept of identity, is based on the pro-indigenous campaign 
with the characterization of the mixed nature of the national identity of the States. (Mudde C., 
2011). In particular, even if there is a lack of a pure national identity, the strength of the Latin 
American populism can be found in the ideology of the “Americanismo” adopted mainly by 
Morales and Chavez; this idea made it possible to reunite under the same umbrella different 
ethnic and social groups overcoming therefore the problem of defining a pure national identity 
(Mudde C., 2011). 
Following this characteristic, it is possible to provide another classification for populism; the 
inclusive populism and the exclusive populism. The populism of the Latin American states is 
the inclusive one; it starts with the inclusion of specific social classes in the reform objectives 
of their economic programs, it utilizes the “Americanismo” phenomenon in order to group 
together a wide number of different ethnic and social classes (that is all the “normal” people 
of the country) in order to fight against the establishment with the final aim to defend the 
States from foreign countries that are considered to exploit or to make such areas 
underperforming. (Mudde C., 2011) 
The form of populism typical of the European States, instead, is the exclusive one; this 
difference can find one of its sources in the radical different life conditions of the two areas in 
which the respective populations lives. If in Latin America there is a fight in order to obtain 
the conditions necessary to live a good life, in Europe these conditions are (in majority) 
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already obtained and, consequently, the ultimate goal is to protect the actual States; the threats 
to this equilibrium are usually identified by the populist parties with the immigrants, the 
foreigners, the refugees and the political parties (or the establishment in general) that support 
policies in their favour since they are seen as a potential, disruptive element for their 
democracies. As a result, the exclusive characteristic above mentioned is translated in the 
exclusion of certain groups from the planned policies of the populist parties; as we have seen 
before with the division between “natives” and “aliens”, this populism is characterized by a 
widespread sentiment of national preference also because, at the light of such populist parties, 
the immigration phenomenon with its correlated causes and consequences, is seen as menace. 
It is worth saying that the exclusive populism typical of Europe still presents a characteristic 
of inclusiveness within itself; this inclusiveness can be found in the natural objective to 
include a vast majority of people/voters together in order to defeat the establishment and to 
propose economic and social reforms that are closer to the people themselves. At the end, 
though, this inclusive characteristic is turned into an exclusive one since the proposed reforms 
are done in order to protect the country against the outside groups which are identified as a 
threat. (Kaltwasser C.R., Mudde C., 2013) 
We can conclude this paragraph by saying that the populism of Latin America can be 
described with this sentence “including the poor” while the populism is Europe can be 
identified with “excluding the Alien”. 
1.4 THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF POPULISM 
The phenomenon of populism, as we have seen before, is a multifaced thing, with many 
interpretations, with different visions and different characteristics, objectives and priorities. 
One of the most useful categorizations for the populism ideology is the division between the 
right-wing populism and the left-wing populism. 
The main difference between the left- wing and the right-wing populism can be found in the 
respective importance they give with regard to egalitarianism; the left side is more focused on 
proposing a model where all people have the possibility to have access to the same resources, 
to the same possibilities, resulting in a set of reforms which aims to eliminate any social 
inequalities whereas the right-wing populism identify the inequalities between the people that 
belong naturally to a certain State (the natives) and those who do not (the aliens). (Mudde C., 
2011) 
The economic aspect is particularly important for the left-wing populism; structured on the 
class-based division of the society the left-wing populism aims to eliminate the economic 
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inequalities at the base of such division while the right-wing populism gives less attention to 
the economic aspect of the operation; they believe that the current economic reforms based on 
the social-democratic ideology are appropriate, they base their economic programs on the 
increase of the welfare state, on the increase of the protectionism and, in general, they demand 
for more social benefits but only for the ”nationals”.  If the focus of the left-wing populism 
can be found in the economics, the focus of the right-populism can be found in the socio-
cultural issue; as we have said before, the anti-immigration policies, the protection from the 
foreigners and from foreign model are the central point to such political programs which aim 
at the re-establishment and the protection of the national cultures. (Silvia B.C., 2017) 
1.5 THE TWO SIDES OF POPULISM 
To better understand the phenomenon of populism it is necessary to explain the supply side of 
populism as the presence of populist parties in the political arena and the demand side as the 
voters and their characteristic or the variables that can have importance and can influence 
their final decision. 
We are going to provide a better insight in the next two paragraphs. 
1.5.1 The demand side of populism 
With respect to the demand side of populism we refer to the behaviour of the voters; their 
behaviour is affected by factors such as the economic insecurity, the lack of trust toward the 
traditional political parties and establishment but, most importantly, their behaviour is linked 
with the abstention based entry space as theorized by Guiso ,Herrera, Morelli and Sonno in 
“Populism: Demand & Supply”, 2018. The lack of trust toward the traditional parties creates 
an abstention-entry space in which the voters will not support anymore the traditional 
establishment, and this gives the possibility to the new parties, in this case, the populist one to 
rise. This, in combination with a condition of economic insecurity, can lead people to change 
their votes in support to this new parties. 
The variables that influence voters’ behaviour in the study of Guiso et al. are: the economic 
insecurity which can have different forms such as the unemployment, the financial distress, 
the exposure to globalization of low-skilled workers, the competition in labour market due to 
immigration, and the trust toward the traditional politics and institutions. (Guiso L., Herrera 
H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2) 
Trust plays in important role; trust can be identified as something independent from the 
achievement of a specific output or, generally, it is not conceived as the unconditional support 
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to a specific political party or a specific political actor, but it refers mostly with the degree of 
certainty/uncertainty that the population has about its future. (Li A., 2018) 
Political trust is seen therefore as the capability of the actual ruling class to manage the 
different situations and how it can be able the solve the difficulties; in evaluating the level of 
trust the population may adopts performance measures that are more pragmatic such as the 
capability of the government to cope with crises, their conditions after the adoption of the 
proposed political strategy, in general measured on an individual or on an economic and 
social level. Just to propose an example the political trust of and individual may be greater 
toward the current ruling class if, in a situation of financial distress, it received the support 
from governmental agencies, and it will be lower in the opposite case. The concept of trust is 
important since it relates with the abstention-entry space mentioned before and the behaviour 
of the voters at the ballot boxes. 
The voters’ patience is important too; the voters which have preferences in the short-term 
results are more likely to vote for populist parties while voters with a preference on long-term 
results are less likely to support them, with or without considering the resilience of the 
institutions and, consequently, only voters with intermediate patience base their choice on the 
resilience of institutions. If these voters live in countries with established democracies and 
strong institutions, they are more willing to elect a populist party since they anticipate that the 
presence of strong institutions will mitigate and limit the potential negative consequences of 
the populist measures. (Chesterley N., Roberti P., 2018) 
1.5.2 The supply side of populism 
The presence of populist parties in the political arena is the consequence of certain factors; the 
economic insecurity, the break of trust toward the democracies and the current form of 
government, the weakening of the other political parties which normally would include most 
of the voters. The economic insecurity variable is surely the most important one because it 
encompasses a direct effect and an indirect effect; the direct effect is related with the unstable 
economic conditions of the voters which may vote for the populist parties because of the 
attractive proposes, because of the promises of a redistribution of the resources in a way 
which is more than favourable for them. Secondly, the indirect effect is related with the 
consequences of the economic insecurity; the populist parties attribute the causes of the 
economic uncertainties to the current political parties and, in general, to the current 
establishment, creating a climate of distrust toward their political adversaries. 
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The populist parties are not necessarily directly affected by these situations but surely, they 
benefit from this climate; the political distrust and the desire for change creates a 
disappointment with respect to the traditional parties and create room for the entry and the rise 
of new parties (the populist ones). (Guiso L, Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2) 
In a study of 2018 by Guiso, Herrera, Morelli and Sonno titled “Populism: demand & supply” 
the determinants of the supply side of populism were identified in: 
- presence and entry: whether and when to entry in the political arena is determined by the 
level of economic insecurity, the exposure to globalization and, last but not least, by the 
strength of the political opponents; 
-orientation choices: the second choice regards the political oriental that the populist party 
will decide for itself, a choice that, ultimately, will result in a decision between the left-wing 
or the right-wing populism. This choice is mainly influenced by the relative entry space which 
reflects the main orientation of the electorate and by the main sources of the economic 
insecurity conditions; 
-policy platform choice: in this case both the left-wing and the right-wing populism will 
propose a set of reforms mainly focused on the short-term orientation having as main 
objectives the anti-establishment policies, the protectionism and the concealment of the long-
term costs. The anti-establishment variable can be seen as the diminishing in the political 
corruption, the protectionism may have the form of deregulation, anti-immigration policies, 
redistribution of wealth and economic intervention and the concealment of long-term costs 
can be seen as the position taken with respect to issue like the environment and the 
international security or peace-keeping policies. (Guiso L, Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 
2018,2) 
The presence of populist policies in general, considering also the deviation of the traditional 
parties to a more populist vision, can be influenced by many factors such as the cost of 
bribing, the percentage of corrupted politicians and the polarization of the society. 
When the cost of bribing is low or, conversely, when it is more difficult to detect, the rich 
elite has a greater incentive to spend in order to influence the decision of the politicians and, 
consequently, when the percentage of corrupted politicians in a society is greater there are 
more possibility to have signs of populist presence; also, when a greater discrepancy between 
the median voters and the rich elite is present, the political parties are more likely to convert 
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to a populist vision in order to attract that large majority of the voters. (Acemoglu D., 
EgorovG., Sonin K., 2012) 
The populist would like the institutions to be as weak as possible in order to enter, to reduce 
the costs of seizing them; the populist side may also have the incentive to commit to create  
independent institutions in order to convince the uncertain voters (which are the voters with 
an intermediate level of patience) that they will not be able to seize the control and so they 
represent the worth choice for the country (Chesterley N., Roberti P., 2018) 
1.6 WHY IS POPULISM ON THE RISE? 
The recent years has shown a trend of increasing voters’ shares allocated to populist parties 
within a lot of European States; during the last European pools in France Marine Le Pen’s FN 
obtained the 23% of preferences and Matteo Salvini’s Lega obtained the 34% of votes in 
Italy, just to quote the two most important examples. These results point the attention to the 
consequences behind this rise. (Horowitz J., 2019) 
It seems that populism and its consequent rise may be connected with the presence of a crisis 
in the Member States; this crisis is a multi-faced phenomenon because it encompasses the 
economic dimension, the cultural dimension and the sociological dimension. Everything 
started in 2008 with the financial crisis which put many countries of the world (and of course 
the ones of the European Union) in a situation of financial distress. The most utilized 
economic reforms adopted in order to fight against such problem was the austerity which 
ultimately created greater economic and social inequalities, resulting in an increasing 
sceptical sentiment toward the European Union and the integration of the Member States. 
With the proliferation of such conditions the rise of populist parties can be justified because 
they represented the voice of the defenceless people against the sinister politics and 
establishment, identified in the politicians, banks, industrialists, financial institutions and 
European institutions. (Kriesi H., Pappas T.S., 2015) 
This economic crisis presented three different aspects; a competitiveness crisis which caused 
the slowing down of the economic performances, a banking crisis which caused a solvency 
and liquidity problem and the sovereign debt crisis. These three different aspects didn’t 
happen in a uniform way throughout the European territory due to the specific characteristics 
of each singles Member States. (Kriesi H., Pappas T.S., 2015). The creation or the rise of 
populist parties was more favoured in the countries in which the consequences of the 
economic crisis were more pronounced such as in Italy with the creation of the Five Stars 
Movement in 2009, the rising of the FN in France which passes from a 6,3 % of consensus in 
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the 2009 to a 33% of consensus in 2017 during the last presidential election; in general, the 
severe consequences of the economic crisis disrupted the traditional parties and politics in the 
Member States, giving the possibility and the space to the populist parties to proliferate.  
The rise of populism in Europe has also other variables that should be considered in order to 
provide a better insight of the actual situation; in Europe there was the presence of the so 
called “China effect”, which can be considered as the effects of globalization on the Member 
States of the Union. The “China effect” refers to the situation in which the more industrialized 
areas of the European Union suffered from the competition coming from the Asian countries 
where the work force presents a lower cost which caused a consequent delocalization; the 
threat represented by the “China effect” resulted in lower wages and greater uncertainty of the 
job which turned into the presence of more nationalistic sentiment in the affected areas which 
allowed populism to rise. The consequences could be even harder if these perceived effects 
are not fought properly by the actual government because of the presence of EU directives or 
other EU policies, generating a climate of distrust not only toward the current ruling class but 
mostly against the European Union itself. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 
2018,1) 
The remaining three factors that are typical of the Eurozone and that are very important in 
order to describe the phenomenon of populism are the relocation effect, the policy strait-
jacket and the frustration effect. 
The relocation effect is indeed the situation that was described before; the presence of a real 
threat in the competition coming from the Asian countries put a lot of insecurity in the 
western industrialized areas of the Eurozone with the firms that decide to relocate in the 
Eastern side of the EU because of its lower costs and this created a positive correlation with 
the rise of populist policies in those areas. Considering this variable, it is important to point 
the attention to a specific situation which is the different influence that this factor had on the 
Eurozone; as we know the Eurozone is a wide and differentiated region and, consequently, 
there are areas in which the relocation effect was less strong. The diminishing importance of 
this factor is located in the Eastern zone of the European Union where the wages and, in 
general, the working conditions and labour costs are more similar to the Asian countries than 
to the Western Zone of the EU, resulting in a less strong presence of such factors in those 
areas. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) The relocation effect is also less 
strong in non-eurozone countries because they have the possibility to counter the loss in 
competitiveness with a devaluation of the exchange rates and consequently to suffer less from 
such situation. 
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The policy strait-jacket, instead, refers to the limited space given to the Member States of the 
European union in terms of fiscal policy and the absence of an independent monetary policy 
to counter country specific risk or problems. This independency would have been particularly 
important in situation of financial distress, such as the financial crisis that started in 2008 and 
that brought in economic distress the majority of the European States, where the presence of 
an ad hoc monetary and fiscal policy for each country would have been required in order to 
have a cyclical policy response. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
The Frustration effect, instead, can be linked with the final decision that the voters do at the 
ballot boxes; the abstention from the votes or the preferences given to a new political solution 
(e.g. the populist party) are influenced by the incapability of the actual ruling class to manage 
the situation, to propose a real solution to the financial distress and, under this conditions, 
voters are more likely to embrace the ideology of “Exit from the EU” ( which is the forte of 
the populist policies) without considering the secondary aspects and the potential negative 
consequences of such actions. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
These three different factors are closely correlated one with each other; for example, the 
frustration effect is stronger in the countries within the European Union where there is the 
policy strait-jacket: the limited space in terms of monetary and fiscal policy given to the 
current ruling class and the negative economic conditions in which each country found itself 
provided a fertile ground for populist parties to convince the voters to devaluate the traditional 
political parties; these aspects were even more important in the most distressed countries such 
as Italy and Greece which suffered the most the austerity imposed by the European Union and 
this ultimately resulted in the increasing importance, in the aftermath of the elections, of 
populist parties such as Lega and Five Star Movement in Italy and Syriza in Greece. 
The combination of these three factors is extremely important and it explains partially the rise 
of populism in the European Union; if we consider a worker that is located in one of the area 
that suffered the most from the relocation effect ,which ultimately resulted in a major degree 
of economic uncertainty for the losers, and, in addition to this, he sees the inability of its 
government to solve this situation due to the policy strait-jacket, it is more likely for him to 
being affected by the frustration effect during the election, resulting in a rise of consensus 
toward the populist parties. 
All the previously considered factors are equally important in order to describe the 
phenomenon of populism in Europe; it is necessary to say that the rise of populism can’t be 
linked with just a couple of factors taken in isolation because it is a complex phenomenon 
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where a high number of different factors play their role both in isolation or in combination 
with others, making its analysis highly difficult.  
1.7 THE CRISIS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In addition to the already cited causes and factors it is important to say that the rise of 
populism in Europe is also linked with a growing trend of crisis against the form of 
representative democracy, the instrument which connects the will and the voice of the people 
with the policy making aspects. The decline of the representative democracies may have 
different explanations that vary from country to country; considering the Western Europe the 
crisis may be linked with the inability of the traditional parties to meet their voters’ interest 
resulting in a declining of party membership and in the absence of identification with the 
political proposals but the crisis can be explained also with the attribution of responsibility of 
the economic conditions to the current establishment and to the political forces that were on 
the political arena at the time of the crisis and this, in combination with their incapability to 
meet the voters’ preferences, caused the decline of the traditional parties in Western Europe.  
(Kriesi H., Pappas T.S., 2015)  
Another explanation is the one provided by Abts and Rummens in their study titled “Populism 
versus Democracy”, 2007 in which democracies are defined as the combination of a 
democratic pillar, stating that the political legitimacy requires the supreme authority to be 
embedded in the people and, with the process of democratic representation, it is possible to 
satisfy the will of the people and the liberal pillar which claims that the supreme authority 
resides within the law.  
Consequently, the rise of populism can be explained as the desire, proposed by the populist 
parties, to realign the balance between these two pillars which, according to them, were out of 
balance for too much time with a disproportion toward the liberal pillar which resulted in 
politicians uninformed about the real will of the people and with the consequent threat to the 
sovereignty; the natural consequence is to give the power back to the democratic pillar which 
is based on the re-establishment of power to the people. (Abts K., Rummens S., 2007) 
The situation in the Central and Eastern Europe was slightly different because there was the 
absence of consolidated parties in the political arena; this lack of consolidation resulted in a 
high level of volatility during the election and, with the distresses caused by the economic 
crisis, the absence of a strong coalition provided a great opportunity to the populist parties to 
take their place in the political arena as well. The dissatisfaction caused by the economic 
reforms and performances of such States, in combination with the high volatility of the 
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traditional parties, created the optimal conditions for the birth of populist parties which 
proposed themselves as the voice against the elite. (Kriesi H., Pappas T.S., 2015) 
It is worth saying that the crisis of the representative democracies was not caused by the 
economic crisis of 2008; they were presenting problems even before those events but the 
dramatic consequences of the economic crisis put a lot of attention on those political models 
and, consequently, they highlighted their limitations and their responsibilities, resulting in the 
consequences that we are analysing in such document. 
Another interesting study published in 2013 by Wolfgang Merkel titled “Is there a crisis of 
democracy? Can we answer the question?” proposes a different vision where the crisis of 
democracies and, consequently, the rise of populism are seen as a collective process of 
accumulated crisis of different types put in a logical order. This sequence is presented below: 
- Economic crisis which shows its effects on the economic cycle, on the growth of a 
country and on the correlated themes which brings to a → 
- Rationality crisis which encompasses the failure of the traditional administrative and 
political department with a subsequent presence of Welfare State deficiencies which 
bring to a → 
- Legitimation crisis which can be seen as the lack of support from the majority of the 
population to the traditional form of democracy which brings to a → 
- Motivational crisis considered as a lack or as a declining trend toward work ethics 
policies or normative order of democracy. 
 
Figure 1: (Merkel W., 2013) 
These four different types of crisis may be considered as the same face of a very complex 
situation in which it is extremely difficult to provide just one explanation; other factors that 
contribute to the crisis of the traditional democracies are the de-legitimation of the political 
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authority, the increase in political participation, the disaggregation and fragmentation of 
interests and the increasing expectation and overload of interest of the voters. (Merkerl W., 
2013) 
1.8 THE CULTURAL BACKLASH THESIS 
The cultural backlash thesis tries to explain the rising of populism on a social and 
psychological perspective; according to this theory the populist parties are majorly voted by 
the older generations which seeks a political representative that protects the classic long-term 
vision and that list the respect and the conservation of the traditional, old values as a primary 
point in his political agenda. 
In the recent period a more progressive vision of the world has taken place, more respect and 
more rights are attributed to the different minorities and an ongoing process of integration, 
both on an economical side but also on a social side is happening; this created consequently a 
major polarization between the older and the younger generation where the former feel 
themselves as the last point on the priorities in the political agendas in the different States. 
The populist parties, by proposing themselves as the protector of the classic and traditional 
values of the country were able to intercept this part of the population alongside with other 
groups. (Inglehart R.F., Norris P., 2016) 
Additionally, the study of 2016 by Inglehart and Norris titled “Trump, Brexit and the Rise of 
populism: Economic-have nots and cultural backlash” provides a very interesting depiction 
about the major characteristic that the voters of populist parties have: 
- age: a stronger support to populist parties is provided by the older generation, confirming the 
gender gap; 
- education: it was shown that the majority of supporters of populist parties comes from the 
least educated sectors of the society; 
- religiosity: the greater support to populist parties comes from people which present this 
characteristic as it is seen as a factor which determines the traditional values of a country; 
- minority: less support to populist parties was provided by the minorities of a society such as 
ethnic minority just to cite one; 
- support from the petty bourgeoisie: the populist parties, even if they obtain support also 
from professional workers and managers, are mostly diffused among this social class, like 
small proprietors; 
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- location of the voters: this study shows that most of the support given to populist parties 
comes from the rural areas of a country where there are greater possibilities to find situation 
of economic insecurity and social deprivation than in urban centres. 
This study concludes that the main support to populist parties is provided by older people, by 
the religious and the least educated branches of the population while less support was given 
by the minorities (of all types) within a society. (Inglehart R.F., Norris P., 2016) 
1.9 THE DURKHEIMIAN APPROACH 
This approach, theorized by Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser, considers the rise of populism 
as a consequence to great social changes which took the form of modernization and 
industrialization in Latin America and the form of globalization in Europe with consequent 
variations in the values of the society. The sectors of the economy and, in general, the workers 
more penalized by the advent of globalization such as the blue-collar workers and the low-
skilled workers or, to generalize the “losers to globalization”, have lost  their social and 
material status and they were the one that saw in the populism a solution to restore the 
national identity and to fix their problems. (Silva B.C., 2017) 
1.10 THE DOWNSIAN APPROACH 
This approach, also theorized by Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser, considers the economic 
variable as the sole factor that contributes to the populist rise. The economic variable that this 
approach considers is the economic grievance which is upon each individual of the society 
who, ultimately, acts as a rational player who wants to obtain the best material solution for 
himself. 
So, the dissatisfaction of the individual in this approach is linked with the economic 
leadership of the country, with the capability of the government to create and deliver better 
living conditions to the population, with the capability to protect the national economy from 
any potential threat; the failure to reach these objectives is seen as a direct consequence of the 
intentional action perpetuated by the elite. (Silva B.C., 2017) 
By comparing the Durkheimian approach and the Downsian approach the main difference is 
easily recognisable; while the former approach focuses its explanation on a more ideological 
level with the cultural and social dimensions, the latter approach focuses it explanation solely 
on the economic dimension resulting in a more material method. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1 THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF POPULISM 
So far, there was a description of the determinants of populism from different points of view 
and different interpretations provided by the classical literature; in this chapter the focus is 
pointed at the understanding of the economic determinants of populism. 
The work of 2018 by Guiso et al. titled “Populism: demand & supply”, whose focus is to 
analyse the determinants at the basis of the demand and of the supply of populism, considers 
many variables; first of all, it considers the determinants of the voters by categorizing three 
different variables: the economic insecurity, the trust toward the political spectrum and other 
controls (such as education, the attention to politics and the risk aversion). The first point is 
the one that is particularly useful for this chapter since it considers the economic insecurity 
which is measured with three different factors: the unemployment period of the voters, the 
level of financial distress of the electors and finally the exposure to globalization since it can 
be connected with the threat posed to the low-skilled workers in manufacturing to the loss of 
their job position due to the politics adopted to counter globalization shocks; the study 
considers also an element apt to evaluate the sentiment toward immigration, since it 
represents a proxy to measure the competition in the labour market. These three measures are 
used in combination since one single dimension would not be enough to explain a multi-faced 
phenomenon like this one. The economic dimension is particularly important according to this 
study since it influences the results in two different ways by discouraging the voters from 
electoral participation, thus creating an empty space for the populist platform, and by 
increasing the likelihood of voting for populist. Following the previous measures that were 
introduced to express the economic insecurity dimension, the populist preferences are more 
likely to be found in people who have lost their job, that have suffered from a situation of 
financial distress and have been exposed to globalization; the study, indeed, shows that a 
change in the economic insecurity dimension of one standard deviation point creates a 
decrease by 6,8% in the electoral turnout and a higher support for the populist platform by 
11,5%. As we have seen before the sentiment toward immigration was used as a proxy to 
understand the threat posed to low-skilled workers by the competition in the labour market 
and, indeed, an increase of one standard deviation point in the anti-immigrants’ sentiments 
lowers the electoral participation by 1% and increases the votes supporting the populist parties 
by 6,1%. An additional finding depicts that for the people who pass from a condition of 
economic security to a one of economic insecurity there is an increase in probability of voting 
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populist by 56% of the unconditional sample mean and the probability of voting participation 
decrease by 33%. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2)  
As we can see from the figure below an increase in the economic insecurity (the Venn 
diagrams on the left and on the right represent respectively the situation before and after an 
increase in the economic insecurity) leads to an increase in the electoral abstention (A in the 
figure below) and to an increase of support to populist parties (P in the figure below) and to a 
decrease of support to non-populist parties (NP in the figure below). 
 
Figure 2: (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2) 
The economic insecurity factors considered in the study of Guiso et al. can also influence the 
electoral participation and the support toward the populist platform in an indirect way since 
they influence the trust toward the established political parties and toward immigration. 
 
Figure 3: (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2) 
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As we can see from the panels above there is a correlation between a change in economic 
insecurity and a change in the trust toward the political parties; a one-point standard deviation 
increase in the economic insecurity lowers the trust toward the political parties by 7,3%. The 
panel also tells us that an increase of one standard deviation point in the economic insecurity 
increases the negative sentiment toward no-EU immigrants by 5% confirming that a situation 
of economic insecurity lowers the trust toward the political parties and increases the hostility 
toward no-EU immigrants. To sum up, considering all the effects and the measures together, 
the study shows that an increase by one standard deviation point in the economic insecurity 
creates an increase for populist voting by 11,3%; the 92% of this increase is attributable to the 
greater support for the populist party, the 6% to the lower trust toward other parties and the 
3% to the increasing fear of immigrants. Also, an increase by one standard deviation point in 
economic insecurity results in a lower electoral participation by 8,5% with the 93% of such 
decrease attributable to its direct effect, the 6% to the lower trust toward political parties and, 
finally, 1% to the increasing fear of immigrants. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 
2018,2) 
When moving to the supply side it is shown that the supply of populism is greater in countries 
where the economic insecurity is higher and where there is a greater exposure to 
globalization; an increase in the economic insecurity by 1 standard deviation point creates an 
increase in the numbers of the populist parties by 35% and, an increase by 1 standard 
deviation point in the share of imports (here utilized as a proxy to measure the exposure to 
globalization) creates an increase of populist parties by 22%. These results show that there is 
a greater chance of seeing the rise of populist parties when there are situations of economic 
insecurity and when there is a greater degree of globalization. Finally, this study specifies the 
determinants for a new party when making the choice between left-wing and right-wing 
populism; the income inequality drives the probability for the new born party to be a left-wing 
one, with an increase by 1% in the standard deviation of the income inequality that moves the 
orientation by the 21% to the left side of populism. The shift toward the right side of populism 
is driven by the share of immigrants from Muslim countries with an increase by 1% in its 
standard deviation that creates a more likely populist parties’ orientation to the right by 29%. 
(Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,2) 
Another study proposed by Guiso et al. of 2018 titled “Global crisis and populism: the role of 
eurozone institutions” poses the attention on additional factors that may be particularly 
interesting in order to have a better insight of such phenomenon. There is a consideration 
about the frustration effect and the relocation effect; the frustration effect can be considered as 
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a behavioural attitude in response to an economic situation where the voters who suffer from a 
situation of financial distress or that are threatened by the exposure to globalization are more 
likely to be disillusioned by the economic policies of the traditional parties and are more 
likely to abstain from future elections or to consider the “exit from Euro” alternative proposed 
by the populist parties. The relocation effect, instead, is referred to the situation in which the 
firms located in the western side of the European Union are threatened by the competition 
coming from the Asian countries since they present lower production costs, a situation which 
ultimately results first in the relocation of the firms from the western side of the EU to the 
Eastern side of the EU (because of their lower costs) and then, for the country of origin, in a 
loss of competitiveness and of wealth. Another important concept is the one of the policy 
strait jacket that is the impossibility for the countries belonging to the European Union to 
adopt a fully independent economic policy to respond to the crisis of the markets, a situation 
which may ultimately worsen certain effects of the crisis. This dimension is measured with 
three indicators: the loss of discretion in devaluing the currency in the case of a loss of 
competitiveness (a particularly relevant problem if the nation belong to a single currency 
Union), the constraints on the domestic fiscal policies  such as the constraints contained in the 
Growth and Stability Pact and the lack of discretion in setting the monetary policy, 
particularly relevant if a country is experiencing a specific shock that requires country-level 
reforms. The presence of the policy strait jacket pushes upward the consequences that derive 
from the frustration effect and the relocation effect, increasing consequently the support 
toward the populist platform. The findings of this study are the following; the increase in the 
imports from China (here utilized to measure the level of the relocation effect) by one 
standard deviation point results in an increase by 17,5% of the populist voting shares in the 
Euro-Zone countries. This situation is more likely to be found in the western countries of the 
European Union than in the no European Union countries and in Eastern European countries 
(which are the countries of destination of the relocation effect). (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli 
M., Sonno T., 2018,1) Additionally, the paper proposes a study on the Western European 
Union States and countries that have more independence since they are part of the European 
Union but not of the monetary union (Sweden, UK and Norway) when exposed to the 
globalization effects and with the presence of the so called policy-strait jacket; it was found 
that for these three countries the effects of the globalization shocks resulted to be smaller than 
in the Eurozone countries. Furthermore, the policy strait jacket has different consequences 
also with respect to its relative presence and interference in the country considered; in such 
study it was found that in the countries where the policy strait jacket was below the 75th 
percentile (used here as a threshold) the effects of the financial crisis increase the support to 
26 
 
populist voting by 13% while where the policy strait jacket was above the 75th percentile the 
effects of the financial crisis increase the populist voting by 59% of the sample mean. The 
study shows that in the countries where there are constraints on the domestic policies the 
frustration effect is considerable and the support toward the populist parties is greater since 
the European institutions are seen as the cause to the loss of discretion in the macroeconomic 
policies; such trend is more evident in Euro zone countries where there is a greater degree of 
the policy strait jacket rather than in the no- Euro zone countries. As we can see from the table 
below the drop of trust toward the European Parliament is much greater for the countries 
belonging to the European union with a drop of 30% in 2014 compared with the 2000 with 
instead the western and eastern no-Euro zone countries drop of 10% points with respect to the 
2000 average. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
 
  Figure 4: (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
The following panel provided by the same study shows the correlation between the trust in the 
European parliament and the strength of the policy strait jacket in the European countries, 
showing that the increase in magnitude of the policy-strait jacket results in a lower trust 
toward the European parliament. (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
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Figure 5: (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
The paper considers also the situation of economic insecurity caused by the financial crisis 
that boost the support to populist parties in countries with more financially dependent 
industries with an increase of their voting share by 42% of the sample mean following the 
2008 financial crisis; the rationale behind such results is that the countries that are more 
dependent on external finances are hit harder by the economic crisis that creates more 
economic uncertainty and that, ultimately, results in a higher support to populist parties. Also, 
when a third interaction term is included in the analysis (between the financial dependence, 
the crisis and the country variable), the effects of the crisis and of the financial dependence 
are stronger with an increasing support to populist voting by 52% of the share votes in the EZ 
regions (Guiso L., Herrera H., Morelli M., Sonno T., 2018,1) 
A 2018 study by Jonathan Hopkin and Mark Blyth titled “The global economics of European 
populism: growth regimes and party system change in Europe” takes the income inequality as 
the driver for the greater support to the populist parties considering that, the larger the share of 
potential voters that suffers from income decline or income inequality, the greater the chances 
of having more people voting for populist parties, rejecting the classic growth model proposed 
by the incumbent cartel parties. 
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As we can see from the two figures below there was a positive correlation in 2008 between 
the income inequality (measured with the Gini coefficient) and the support to populist parties 
in the first figure while the second shows a negative correlation between the compound 
growth wage and the support to populist parties up to 2014. 
 
Figure 6: (Blyth M., Hopkin J., 2018) 
 
Figure 7: (Blyth M., Hopkin J., 2018) 
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In general, the findings of this study show that in a model of inclusive economic growth, a 
situation where in a country the income of the individual are in a condition of stability or in an 
upward trend, it is more difficult for the populist platform to beat the traditional party system 
(Blyth M., Hopkin J., 2018). 
The economic inequality is a driving element of the study of 2016 by Ronal F. Inglehart and 
Pippa Norris titled “Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: economic have-nots and cultural 
backlash” where there are several considerations about the potential economic causes at the 
basis of the rise of populism. This study considers the theory of growing economic 
inequalities where, starting from the early twenty-first century, the more advanced societies 
saw the rise of new under-classes among the poorly-educated populations. These new social 
categories can include in their limits the low-skilled, blue collar underclass, individuals with 
low wages and minimal job security, people who are more exposed to the effects of the 
financial crisis and more exposed to the threats of globalization, in general people more 
vulnerable to social risk.  In the recent years, despite the economic growth of certain 
countries, the income and the wealth inequality has grown as well; the gains that derived from 
such economic growth in the Western countries were allocated almost entirely to the top ten 
percent of the population, widening even more the income differential. The vast majority of 
the population that wasn’t affected by such wage growth has seen the inequality worsened 
even more because of the erosion of blue-collar union, the growth of the knowledge economy, 
the growth of the outsourcing, the growing capital and labour mobility, the globalization and  
the limited capability of the national governments to regulate the investment decisions of the 
single firms. This concept of economic inequality is linked with the rise of populism in such 
countries where (the populism) proposes itself as the one who understood this inequality that 
derives from the division between winners and losers. Any subsequent events that can add 
additional insecurity like immigration flows, terrorism, acts or austerity measures are blamed 
of worsening the economic grievances of the inequalities. Populism consequently, according 
to such study, will be highly considered in the marginalized sectors of the economy; the 
voters of populist parties are more likely to be the house-hold dependent on welfare benefits, 
the unskilled workers, the unemployed ones, and those who lives in the inner-city urban areas 
and, in general, those who subjective find difficulties in having economic stability. The graph 
below shows that the greater support to populist parties can be found in the petty bourgeoise, 
the working class, the routine nonmanual and the foreman and the technicians, individuals 
that can better represent the above-mentioned categories. Even if this model can explain in a 
good way the rise of populism the economic dimension loses its importance and its relevance 
30 
 
further on in the study when it interacts with other factors such as the cultural values and the 
demographic variables. (Inglehart R.F, Norris P., 2016) 
 
Figure 8: (Inglehart R.F, Norris P., 2016) 
Furthermore, a recent study of 2018 by Sergei Guriev titled “Economic drivers of populism” 
tracked the change in support to populist parties in 240 regions of 26 countries of the 
European Union between the 2000 and the 2017 considering as factors worth of analysis the 
economic crisis and the globalization. In this paper it is highlighted that unemployment in 
particular can be considered as an important factor to explain populism since a 1 % point 
change in unemployment results in a 1% change toward the populist votes, a data that results 
even more consistent when considering the unemployment increase by the pre-crisis 
composition of the regional economy; here a 1% increase in unemployment results in a 2% 
increase in support to populist votes. This result can be explained since even the individuals 
who possess a job are scared by an increase in the unemployment since they could face a 
higher risk of losing their job or a lower possibility to see an increase in their actual wages.  
The globalization in this paper is explained at the light of two categories of workers: the high-
skilled one and the middle-skilled one. The high-skilled workers are positively affected by the 
globalization since they can sell their services to bigger markets while the middle-skilled 
workers, in contrast with the low-skilled workers whose job are too manual and cheap to be 
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outsourced, are outsourced and automated causing this category to be more inclined to 
develop anti-establishment sentiments. Consequently, there will be a different political 
approval between the high-skilled and the middle-skilled workers which increases with the 
proportion of skilled export (in GDP terms) and decreases with the share of skilled imports (in 
GDP terms); indeed, a 10 % point change in the skilled imports creates a decrease in the 
political approval by the skilled workers of 3% (relative to the unskilled ones) or a 10% 
increase in skilled exports results in a 2% increase in political approval by skilled workers 
(relative to the unskilled ones). (Guriev S., 2018) 
As we had the possibility to see so far the globalization, with its consequences and its various 
aspects, is subject of numerous analysis and is consistently presents in the various studies as 
one of the potential cause that can explain the rise of populist parties; globalization plays an 
important role in the 2018 paper by Dani Rodrik titled “Populism and the economics of 
globalization”. The concept at the basis of this study is that the rise of globalization creates a 
situation in which, even in a growing economic trend, there will always be winners and losers 
( a concept which was introduced before)  and consequently the losers need to be compensate 
for their loss in order to create a win-win situation; according to Rodrik the redistributive 
effects of liberalization increase when the trade barriers decrease since they reduce and erase 
the net gains obtained from the globalization. Many countries may be attracted by the 
potential benefits that derive from the globalization but such openness to trade needs to be 
followed by strong redistributive and compensative policies in order to provide a real benefit 
for the country; in general, the compensation policies are usually considered as an add-on to 
trade agreements while they should be a transparent compensation and one of the best form to 
practice such policies is to include them in the social programs of a nation rather than 
considering them as a reactive response to an economic condition. According to Rodrik, such 
policies in certain European countries performed good because they represented a bargain 
between the labour and the capital where there are higher safety nets for the individuals in 
exchange for a more open economy. An inefficient or an absent redistribution creates 
situation of inequality since, theoretically, there are winners but also losers without a proper 
compensation for their loss; it is considered in the cited  paper that even if there are conditions 
that can trigger inequality, as long as there is a high belief in social mobility, even high level 
of inequality will be tolerated.; inequality is more likely to be sensed by the people when there 
is the perception that the losses of a certain part of the population are caused by unfair 
practices. (Rodrik, D., 2018) 
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The globalization is not only referred as the trade liberalization and the openness to the 
market, but it is also considered as a higher degree of integration in the financial markets, a 
greater monetary unification and more capital mobility. In the paper of Rodrik it is stated that 
the greater degree of financial integration moves along with higher frequency of financial 
crisis over time in particularly in the European Union where the monetary unification and the 
financial integration have created a convergence of the borrowing costs among the different 
States; this means that borrowers had the possibility to accumulate large accounts of 
problematic debts, but such credits booms would ultimately turn into bust and aggravate the 
economic conditions of the issuing States once the credits dries up after the financial crisis, 
finding that the capital account liberalization results in an increase on the coefficient of 
income inequality. An additional problems is created by the taxability of the firms; as the 
capital mobility increases it is more difficult for the national governments to tax the local 
firms that may decide to relocate their activities and, in order to recover the loss, the 
governments had to tax more the consumptions and the labour as it is shown in a 2002 work 
of Bretschger and Hettich where the openness to the markets is negatively correlated with the 
corporate tax rate and positively correlated with the labour taxes, providing support to the 
previous assertion. (Rodrik D., 2018) 
Furthermore, in the book “Contemporary issues in international political economy” edited by 
Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Diana S. Swan, 2019 there are additional explanation regarding the 
potential connection between the rise of populism and the globalization; globalization indeed, 
can be seen as an increasing liberalization in the trade (trade globalization), a liberalization of 
the capital movement (financial globalization) and a higher labour mobility. These three 
different dimensions that are embedded in the globalization effects presents also a dark side; 
the financial globalization for example brings a larger degree of volatility in the market, 
increasing consequently the frequency of financial crisis while the labour mobility can create 
potential problems for a developed country since there could be a huge inflow of workers 
from developing countries that can create situation of unemployment and social unrest. The 
globalization and its effects present both positive and negative aspects since there could be a 
consequent increase in the inequality and economic uncertainty and therefore globalization 
needs to be complemented, as we have seen before, by reforms that can exploit the upside 
potential of the trade and of the financial openness and that can soften their negative effects. 
This major problem in the book is illustrated as the political trilemma which comprises as 
angles the deep economic integration, the nation-state and the democratic politics; this scheme 
shows that it is impossible to have all these dimensions managed properly all at the same 
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time. For instance if you want to obtain a full and deep economic integration you should 
remove any transaction cost barriers that obstacle such result, barriers that are erected by the 
nation state (and it would be the case of the global federalism where the scope of the global 
market coincides with the one of the democratic politics); if you want to preserve the nation 
state you should make it responsive only to international stimuli disposing off the power to 
address the domestic objectives (similar to the gold standard during the first wave of the 
globalization) and finally, if there is the desire to preserve both the nation state and the 
democratic politics, then a limited version of globalization is requested (similar to the Bretton 
Woods regime after WWII). This explanation that is provided in the book shows the reason 
behind the impossibility to obtain an optimum in all these three dimensions and, 
consequently, the globalization will always bring winners and losers. This inability to cope 
with the challenges of globalization paved the ground for the inefficiency of the redistributive 
policies and for the growing inequality and, ultimately, for the rise of populism; the greater 
the degree of globalization, the greater will be the inequality and major will be the support to 
populist parties. (Yu Fu-Lai T., Kwan D.S., 2019) 
 
Figure 9: (Yu Fu-Lai T., Kwan D.S., 2019) 
Additional studies provide robustness to the hypothesis that a higher degree of unemployment 
or, in general, a higher degree of uncertainty in the job can be connected with a stronger anti-
European sentiment; it is the case of the paper of 2018 by Marie Lechler titled “Employment 
shocks and anti-EU sentiment”. The paper in order to better explain the unemployment 
phenomenon considers three respondent variables: the image, the benefits and the 
membership. The image variable refers to whether the EU triggers positive or negative 
sentiments (it is more an evaluative variables that describes the degree of pro/anti EU), the 
benefit variable refers to whether the country is considered to have benefited from its 
belonging to the European Union and the membership variables refers to, according to the 
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respondents, whether the EU’s membership is a positive or a negative thing for the individual 
countries. The results of such study demonstrate that there is a correlation between the 
employment rate and the anti-EU sentiments; indeed, a 10% increase in the change of the 
employment rate results in a 4% increase on the image scale, in a 3% increase in the benefit 
scale and a 2% increase on the membership scale resulting in the final comparison to the 
means that an increase of 10% in the change of the employment rate result in a 5-10% change 
in support toward EU. The rationale behind such result is that anti-EU people manifest their 
Euroscepticism during the election as a reactive response to adverse economic conditions (in 
this case the lower employment level) for themselves. The paper continues by categorizing 
the potential causes of the growth of anti-EU sentiment by dividing and by considering the 
effect in isolation and in interaction with other terms as we will see from the following panels. 
Here there was a binarization of the changes in the employment rate with the sole 
consideration between positive and negative; the results are robust since a positive change in 
the employment rate increase the EU image by 3% and the perceived benefit by 2% while the 
membership variable is not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 10: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Here instead there is a study on the absolute employment change separated from the changes 
in active population in order to show that the change is caused by the absolute employment 
dynamic rather than from the change in active population (that is not statistically significant 
as it is possible to see), a result in line with the previous ones. 
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Figure 11: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Following, the level of employment rate is included as a control variable; the results are 
slightly lower compared with the previous ones but still coherent and statistically significant 
for the most of them with a 10 % change in the employment rate that results in a 5%-point 
increase on the image scale for instance. 
 
Figure 12: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Here instead there is the addition of control variables that represent the trust toward the 
national parliament and the national government, and an additional outcome was included, the 
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“trust in EU parliament”. Here the employment changes effects on the EU attitude remains 
coherent for the image and the benefit even if with lower value. Finally, holding constant the 
evaluation of national institutions it can be seen that employment changes influence the trust 
in the EU, showing that a positive change on the employment is reflected on a major value of 
trust in EU parliament. 
 
Figure 13: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Following, there is an additional control that regards the effects of the employment rate during 
the financial crisis measured with the interaction term between the employment rate and the 
crisis dummy which is statistically significant and greater in the value of the coefficients for 
the image and the benefit outcome, showing that the effects of employment changes are 
greater during the years of the recession. 
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Figure 14: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Here it can be seen that the effects of the employment changes are stronger in a situation of 
crisis (post 2008) with statistically significant coefficients that present always higher value 
compared with the pre-crisis situation (for example for the benefit outcome the post crisis 
value of 0,4069 compared with the pre-crisis one of 0,3064). 
 
Figure 15: (Lechler M., 2019) 
Besides analysing the connection between the employment changes and the EU-sentiment the 
study considers the connection between the change in the employment rate and the voting 
behaviour of the European citizens in 5 different European parliament elections 
(1994,1999,2004,2009,2014). The paper found a positive correlation between the variation in 
the employment rates and the pro-Europe voting behaviour; indeed, a 10 % increase in the 
change of employment rates resulted in an increase of 4% on the pro-EU voting; all the results 
that were found in such paper indicate that good labour conditions drive positive sentiments 
and support to the EU while bad labour conditions can be translated into greater support to 
eurosceptic platforms.( Lechler M., 2019) 
A further example in the European context is the one provided by Noam Gidrom and Jonathan 
J.B. Mijs, 2019 in the paper titled “Do changes in material circumstances drive support for 
Populist radical parties? Panel data evidence from The Netherlands during the great recession, 
2007-2015”. This paper provided further proofs that the rise and in general the positive 
attitude toward populism are connected with economic uncertainty, here in this case with a 
change in the income of the individuals; indeed, it was found that a loss of income in low 
income individuals was followed by a growing support for left wing populism. The final 
result of this paper was that the populist parties benefit from the economic crisis since a loss 
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in income is connected with an increasing support to the left populist platform. (Gidron N., 
Mjis J.J.B., 2019) 
A 2017 study by Linuz Aggeborn and Lovisa Persson titled “Public finance and Right-wing 
populism” points the attention on the relation between the rise of a certain type of populism 
and different model of public finances. In such paper the public finances are divided between 
two types of goods: the basic goods which represent basic services such as health care, 
infrastructures and so on and global goods which represent the aid to refugee supporting 
system, contributions to immigrants, foreign aid, etc. The rationale behind this division is that 
the established parties are more likely to spend the public finances between both of these two 
categories while the populist parties want to spend everything on the public good without 
considering the global goods at all. The paper constructed a model useful to explain the 
dynamics above mentioned; in such model the voters have linear preferences toward global 
good and strictly concave preferences onto public goods with the poor voters that demand 
higher level of public good than rich voters since the former have a lower level of private 
consumption (since the demand for public good is determined by the relative cost and 
consumption). As a consequence, the global good can be considered as a competitor of the 
public good for the vulnerable voters seeking for social protection by their governments. The 
right-wing populism, usually an opponent to globalization, to support to refugees and to 
liberal trade, in this competition on the public finances puts its preferences on one category of 
goods, the public one, getting the support from the more vulnerable categories. The rich 
voters will prefer the established parties since they enjoy a higher level of income while the 
more vulnerable categories, as the income gap grows, are more likely to support populist 
parties that prioritize the public spending since they represent their immediate needs. 
(Aggeborn L., Persson L., 2017) 
Finally, the study of 2018 by Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi titled “Inequality aversion, 
populism and the backlash against globalization” provides other useful interpretation by 
considering the rise of populism relative to three factors; inequality, financial development 
(ratio of country’s stock market capitalization to GDP) and trade balance (balance of 
country’s current account to GDP). Ideally the populism should be higher in countries with 
higher inequality, higher financial development and lower trade balance. For the scope of the 
study the authors decided to consider a party as populist when it is nationalist, anti-immigrant 
and anti-elite analysing consequently the relationship between the three potential causes of 
populism and these dimensions that characterize a populist party. (Pastor L., Veronesi P., 
2019) 
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In this first set of panels the paper shows the correlation between the voting share of 
nationalist parties and respectively the inequality, the trade balance and the financial 
development; as we can see there is a positive relationship between the support to nationalist 
parties and the growing inequalities and the financial development and a negative relationship 
with the trade balance. 
 
Figure 16: (Pastor L., Veronesi P., 2019) 
Here instead the same variables are put in relation with the anti-immigrant’s dimension; the 
results are similar compared with the nationalist dimension with a positive relationship 
between the support to anti-immigrants’ parties and the increase in inequalities and in 
financial development and a negative relationship with the trade balance. 
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Figure 17: (Pastor L., Veronesi P., 2019) 
The next graph, that we can see below, consider the three variables in relationship with the 
anti-elite dimension; as before, the relationship between the support to anti-elite parties and 
rising inequalities and financial development is positive and negative with the trade balance.  
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Figure 18: (Pastor L., Veronesi P., 2019) 
The three dimensions that characterize the populist parties present the same results on the 
same variables (even if the magnitudes of the impacts are different) and consequently it is 
reasonable to say that the rise of populist parties is connected with these 3 variables: the 
dimensions considered are proxy utilized to measure the presence of populism which, 
according to these result, appears to be more evident in situation of greater income inequality 
and financial development and in situation when there is a worsening of the trade balance .  
An additional variable, the protectionism, was considered and it presented the same results of 
the three previous dimensions as we can see from the graph below; this last variable was 
included in the analysis of the paper since the populist parties propose policies that are more 
inclined to protectionism over the free trade with a preference of a limitation to the 
globalization and its effects. 
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Figure 19: (Pastor L., Veronesi P., 2019) 
To sum up, it is possible to say that from the studies and the papers above mentioned there 
isn’t a single interpretation to the rise of populism but the most utilized economic drivers  
reside in the economic uncertainty, the economic inequality and the globalization; the 
economic uncertainty and inequality throughout all these studies have presented different 
characteristic such as the level of individual income, the employment level, the perceived 
inequality and the effects of the redistributive policies. The globalization, the other cause, was 
considered in many aspects with for example the frustration effect, the relocation effect, the 
dependence from the industries, the openness to the markets, the integration and the 
outsourcing and the incapability to cope with its negative effects. Also, an important role is 
played by the financial crisis that has increased the support toward populist parties as well. In 
general, the main sources of populism rise can be found in the economic uncertainty and 
insecurity, in all their declensions and aspects. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
As it was possible to see in the previous chapters there are many potential causes to the rise of 
populism and for sure a certain degree of influence can be attributed to the European Union, 
its institutions and its policies; to recall an example, the study of Guiso et al. of 2018 titled 
“Global crisis and populism: the role of eurozone institutions” points the attention to the 
relocation effect which causes different labour costs in the different European States and the 
policy strait jacket which imposes restriction on the fiscal policies of the single countries. 
Populism, indeed, can be considered as a miscellaneous of causes that may work together or 
in isolation and the main drivers of its rise can be different or can have a relative different 
importance according to the zone which is considered as we may recall the differences 
between the aspects of populism in Europe and in Latin America. 
For the purpose of this chapter the zone of interest is the European Union in order to have a 
better insight about the trust crisis that appears to be stronger in the recent years, a crisis that 
has shown its consequences with the Euroscepticism movement, the presence of Eurosceptic 
political parties and the Brexit case. 
Considering the Eurozone the dynamics of populism that we have described before , 
dynamics that “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite” (ed. Mudde Ch.1, p.6) can be 
transcribed with the European union and its institutions as the elite, the part of the society that 
is obtaining the most from the actual situation and the pure people can be considered as the 
people of the different States belonging to the European Union; the traits of populism can be 
traced in such situation since the Euroscepticism movements have the ultimate goal to de-
empower the European Union, they go against their policies by rejecting them and they 
consider the belonging to the European Union, with the consequent adoption of its policies, as 
the main cause of the economic and financial crisis or of the different social problems that a 
society has to face. The European Union and its representatives are seen as a constraints, as a 
limit to the national power of the single States, as a restriction to the monetary and fiscal 
policy of the Member States, they are considered in a negative way from many points of view; 
as we may recall from the definition of populism provided in chapter 1 (ed. Ch.1, p.6, “ 
politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” ) the European Union can 
be considered in this particular case as the “Elite” actor since it represents the obstacle to the 
acquisition of the sovereignty  by the Member States and to the expression of  the true 
democracy that represent the true will of the people. 
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Given these premises the populism in Europe can see its trait of duality between its 
antagonistic groups since the European Union takes the role of sole legislator with the 
national parliaments acting as mere intermediaries and the people take the role of the 
“suppressed”, forced to accept such situation. 
 Ideally, a way to measure the rise of populism in the Euro zone would be to consider the 
spectrum of political parties that can be classified as populist in the different countries that 
belong to the European Union and analyse their results in terms of voters’ share, growth and 
relative importance in the national (Or European) political arena; it could be surely possible 
but the restriction imposed by the time intervals between the different elections wouldn’t have 
produced a consistent number of data in order to perform an analysis. In order to analyse such 
condition, it was considered a trait that can characterizes the populist parties in terms of ideas 
or in terms of what they represent to their potential voters and, in this case, the trait 
considered is the trust toward the European Union, a proxy to analyse the populism; the lower 
the trust toward the European Union the greater should be the support to populist platforms.  
3.2 DATA 
The dataset is a panel containing the data of the attitude toward the European Union, the data 
of the Gini index and other economic variables like the GDP per capita, the unemployment 
rate and the at-risk poverty rate for 15 European countries NUTS 0 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden and U.K.) between 2001 and 2015. 
3.2.1 Trust Toward the European Union 
There are many political parties across the European Union and their classification as populist 
parties would have been more difficult if it would be decided to consider for their 
classification every single characteristic that make a party a populist one and for this reason it 
was decided to consider one common trait that is the resentment against the European Union 
since a populist party in the Eurozone, according to the definition provided before has to be 
counterposed to an “enemy”, the so called Elite and in the Eurozone the European Union 
takes this role. 
Considering the trust toward the European Union as a proxy for measuring the rise, the 
growth and the relative importance of populism in Europe, the aim of this chapter is to 
consider whether this phenomenon has an economic interpretation or not.  
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The data utilized in order to measure the trust toward the European Union were retrieved from 
the Standard Eurobarometer surveys that are published twice a year, during April-May and 
during September-October and, for this specific case, from 2001 to 2015; in the standard 
Eurobarometer the question that was posed to the respondents was:  
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust or 
not to trust it. – The European Union”; 
for the specific case of this study it was utilized the answer “I tend to trust the European 
Union” as the dependent variable and as the proxy in order to measure the level of populism, 
as it was explained before. (Standard Eurobarometer, 2019) 
3.2.2 The Gini Index 
In order to find an economic explanation behind the European trust crisis it was utilized the 
Gini index which is a measure of the inequality within a country; a measure of the inequality 
was chosen since it represents a situation that cause resentment and tension toward the 
institutions and those who govern. 
To understand the Gini index properly it is necessary to make the correct premises; the Gini 
index is a number which is derived from the line of distribution and from the Lorenz curve. 
On a cartesian plane the former is a line at 45° angle that shows an income distribution which 
is perfectly equal (the line A in the graph below) while the latter represents the actual 
distribution of income (line B in the graph below) and it is ultimately a function that explain 
how the cumulative percentage of the rentiers explain the cumulative percentage of the 
national income, that is ultimately how the income is distributed among the population. (2012, 
Dizionario di Economia e Finanza) 
The Gini index is the ratio of the area comprised between the line of equality and the Lorenz 
curve and the whole area subtended to the line of distribution; by measuring this ratio it is 
possible to derive how the income is distributed among the population with a minimum value 
of 0 % (or 0 for the Gini coefficient) which represents the perfect equality and a maximum 
value of 100% (or 1 for the Gini coefficient) which represents maximum inequality.  
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Figure 20: (2012, Dizionario di Economia e Finanza) 
Here some visual representations of the potential range of values that the Gini index can have:   
 
Figure 21: (Juhi, 2019) 
It is important to say that the Gini index is a good measure since it provides an easy to 
interpret, cross-country variable but it does not provide an explanation about the wealth of a 
nation and about the absolute level of income of its population; furthermore, the Gini index 
presents additional biases such as: 
- two countries having the same Gini index but different income distribution; 
- a low value of the Gini index but an extremely high-income inequality; 
- the impossibility to discern the effects of structural changes in the population. 
The data for the Gini index were retrieved from the Eurostat database for the above mentioned 
15 countries for the period that goes from 2001 to 2015; that variable is the Gini coefficient 
(converted in the Gini index for a better interpretation) of equivalised disposable income that 
is the income of a household after tax and other deductions, available for saving or spending 
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and divided by the number of equalised members of the household after their conversion into 
equivalised adults; such measure is provided once a year.(European commission, 2019) 
3.2.3 Additional Data 
Finally, in order to add controls to the analysis additional variables were included in the 
model and such variables were the GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and the at-risk 
poverty rate; the data for the controls were retrieved as well from the Eurostat database for the 
same above mentioned countries and for the same time intervals; they were selected because 
they can potentially distort the result since they represent additional factors that have the 
potentiality to undermine the trust toward the European Union, giving therefore the possibility 
to control for their direct effect and for other related omitted factors. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The idea is to demonstrate that a certain relationship can be found between the trust toward 
the European Union and the Gini index; since the value of the Gini index reaches its peak at 
100% (in which it equals the maximum inequality) it is expected to have a negative 
relationship between the trust toward the European Union and the Gini index since the higher 
the value of the independent variable, the higher the inequality in a country and the lower the 
support or the trust toward the European Union.  
The model utilized for such study is the following: 
Trustit = α + β Giniit + X’it + ε 
where the Trust denotes the mean attitude toward the EU in country “i” at time “t” , Gini is 
the value of the Gini index in country “i” at time “t”, β is the coefficient of interest; X’it is the 
vector for the control variables (Gdp per capita, unemployment level, poverty rate) that will 
be successively included and ε is the error term: this shows only the general model since 
further on in the analysis, time dummy, country dummy and interaction terms will be added 
as well. 
3.4 MAIN RESULTS 
Eurosceptic attitudes or, in general, a negative sentiment toward the European Union can have 
detrimental consequences on the EU stability and can also provide an explanation for the rise 
of populist platforms. 
As we can see from the scatter plot below it appears to be a lack of relationship of any case 
between the level of trust and the Gini index in the time interval considered: 
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Indeed, if it is tried to run a regression analysis on this data in order to see if a potential 
relationship is present between the two variables the results are the following:  
 
As it is possible to see from the Stata output the model proposed does not meet the hypothesis 
that were made; indeed, it does not explain the relationship since the R-squared value is 
extremely low (0.0168), the value of the F-test made not possible to confute the null 
hypothesis (Prob > F =0.1202) and consequently the model can’t be considered as a good one 
in order to predict the relationship between the variables; moreover, looking at the single 
explanatory variable, the Gini index, it can be seen that it is not statistically significant 
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(P>|t|=0.120), making us conclude that a relationship between these two variables can’t be 
proven.  
 
The graph above is the same scatter plot presented before between the trust and the Gini index 
variables with the only addition of the regression line in order to see, from a graphical point of 
view the low level of prediction that the model presented has.  
The years that were taken into consideration for the analysis though, include the beginning 
and the aftermath of the economic crisis, an event that has had major effect on each member 
States belonging to the European Union as well as for their population; for the Eurozone the 
recession it is dated from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 with a fall of 
the industrial production of 1.9 percent in May 2008; of course the negative economic effects 
of the recession were carried on by the single member States in the following years but the 
year of change, the year that divide the period of interest between pre and post crisis 
subperiods can be identified with the 2008. 
Consequently, the 2008 is taken as the year where a potential break in the relationship 
between the two variables happens; to follow, are presented the scatter plots of the evolution 
of the Gini index and the trust toward the European Union throughout the years of interest for 
each single State, with a graphical remark on the dividing year (2008) in order to see if it is 
possible to observe a change. 
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As it is possible to see from the collection of graphs above the value of the Gini index 
presents a slight increase in many countries while the value of the trust variable change 
significantly from the 2008; for all the Countries considered there is a negative trend that 
starts from the 2008 with a decline in trust for every single country. In certain countries the 
decline is particularly drastic for example in Greece and in Germany, for others the decline 
represents a natural continuation for an ongoing trend (like in Italy and in Portugal) but it can 
be said that the trust toward the European Union started to decline in each single Country 
without exceptions from 2008. 
Because of the drastic change that was seen it was necessary to divide the period of 
observation into two different subperiods, the first from 2001 to 2007 and the second one 
from 2009 to 2015, letting the 2008, the year where the crisis starts, excluded from these 
periods; a new variable was created, the “recession = year>=2009” that considers the years 
only from the 2009 (included) and, consequently, each variable paired with this one states that 
the values object of observations are considered from the year 2009 on. 
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Consequently, it can be said that in the next regressions the first one with recession==0 refers 
to the situation from 2001 to 2007 while the second with recession==1 refers to the situation 
from 2009 to 2015. 
 
From the Stata output above it is possible to see a sensible improvement compared with the 
general model presented before with a slight improvement of the R-squared value (from the 
previous 0.0168 to the actual 0.0886), the F test shows the statistical significance of the model 
(Prob > F = 0.0070) and the Gini variable is statistically significant but it presents a positive 
value of the coefficient, a result that is counterintuitive with respect to the hypothesis 
(0.8069). 
 
The above Stata output is the one that considers the relationship between the trust and the 
Gini variable after the 2008; it is possible to see that the value of the R-squared has improved 
significantly (from 0.0168 to the actual 0.3174), the value of the F test shows the significance 
level of the model and the Gini variable, besides being statistically significant, presents a 
coefficient value that is negative (-2.029) as it is expected from the initial hypothesis. 
For this reason, another regression was conducted, the same of the first model, that is the 
regression between the trust and the Gini variable from year 2001 to year 2015 but with the 
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addition of the Gini_recession variable, that considers the Gini values from 2009 to 2015 and 
the recession variable that considers the years just mentioned. 
 
As it is possible to see all the three independent variables are statistically significant at a 5% 
confidence level, with the Gini_recession variable that maintains a negative sign of its 
coefficient; in addition, the R-squared value presents a sensible improvement from the 
previous general model (from 0.0168 to the actual 0.3533) and also from the model that 
considers only the recession years (from the 0.3174 to the actual 0.3533), the value of the  
Root MSE presents a decrease (from the 11.893 of the general model to the actual 9.6936), 
and finally the F test shows that the model is statistically significant and that can consequently  
explain the negative relationship between the trust toward the European Union and the Gini 
Index where a 1%-point increase in the Gini index corresponds to a decrease in the average 
trust toward the European Union by a value of 2.835 point. 
 
The output presented above shows a test (Gini+Gini_recession=0) that considers the value of 
the coefficients of the Gini and the Gini_recession variable in order to see if they present 
similar effects in magnitude but of different sign and if consequently they cancel one with 
each other; as it is possible to see the value of the coefficient of such test is negative and 
statistically significant, showing that the negative effects of the Gini_recession variable are 
stronger than the Gini variable and that the ultimate effect we find in the model has a negative 
sign. 
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The graph presented below shows the evolution of the regression lines between the trust and 
the Gini variable throughout all the years considered: as it is possible to see the relationship is 
positive from 2001 to 2007 and it starts to show a decline from the year 2008 on, a decline 
that starts softly and that become more evident and more sharp in the subsequent years, to be 
more specific from the year 2010. 
 
In addition, starting from the last model utilized with the only exclusion of the “recession” 
variable, several control variables, dummy variables and interaction terms were added in 
order to substantiate the argument: GDP per capita, unemployment rate and at-risk poverty 
rate are the control variables that were added to the model; they were selected since they 
represent economic indicators that can have effects on the dependent variable Yi  and that are 
correlated with the independent variable Xi  . 
The dummy variables that were added were the time variables and the country variables in 
order to absorb the effects of these specific terms and exclude them from the Gini_recession 
variable, to see its pure effect on the regression. 
The interaction terms that were added were the control variable multiplied by the recession 
variable (gdp_recession, u_recession, pov_recession) in order to allow for heterogeneous 
effects of the controls before and after the 2008 recession; finally, in the last model, country 
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specific linear splines with a knot in the recession year were added with the “y” and “y_r” 
variables. 
It is worth saying that all the further models proposed will include additional variables to the 
relationship and, consequently, decrease the variance of the model; an increase of the R-
squared value and a decrease of the Root MSE are expected, warning us that a high value in 
the R-squared or a low value in the Root MSE may not indicate the best effective fit.   
With the addition of the time dummy it is possible to see that the Gini_recession variable still 
remains statistically significant, actually it increases its significance level, as well as for the 
model which improves its fit as it is possible to see from the higher value of the R-squared 
(0.5081) and the lower value of the Root MSE (8.7429); with regard to the time dummy it is 
possible to see that from the year 2009 on the single variables for each year are statistically 
significant at a 5% confidence level while the years from 2002 to 2008 are not statistically 
significant. The further test performed in order to see the significance level and the negative 
sign of the coefficients shows that the coefficient of the Gini_recession variable is stronger 
compared with the one of the Gini variable; also, the test still shows that it is statistically 
significant. 
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The next model, which introduces the three control variables presents the same characteristic 
of the previous model; an increase in the R-squared value, a decrease in the value of the Root 
MSE, the statistically significance of the time dummy from the years 2009 on, and, more 
important than others, the Gini_recession variable maintains its negative sign and its 
significance level, as well as for the test that compares the coefficients of the Gini and the 
Gini_recession variable. Regarding the control variables just added only the GDP per capita is 
statistically significant at a 5% confidence level while the Gini variable loses its significance 
level. 
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The next model introduces the dummy variable for each country and it presents the similar 
results of before with a sensible increase in the R-squared value (0.8768), a reduction in the 
value of the Root MSE (4.5884 compared with the previous 8.5834), the statistically 
significance of the model, with the years that are statistically significant from the 2009 on; the 
control variables changes the significant level, the GDP per capita loses it while the 
unemployment rate acquires it; the most important thing is that the variable of interest, the 
Gini_recession, remains negative in sign and statistically significant. The test of the 
coefficient shows that the overall effect of the Gini coefficients is negative and statistically 
significant even if with a lower value in its coefficient. 
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The next two models introduce the same control variables of before but with an interaction 
with the recession variable in order to see their effects in the years of the recession in the first 
model while in the second there is the exclusion of the country dummy. 
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As it is possible to see from the former one, the model remains statistically significant, it 
presents an increase in the value of the R-squared and a decrease in the one of the Root MSE 
with the years from 2009 on remaining statistically significant, as well as for all the countries 
(with the same exceptions of before); the control variables lose completely their significance 
level, a situation that doesn’t change even when paired with the “recession” variable with the 
only exception of the unemployment rate. The Gini_recession variable remains negative in 
sign and statistically significant as well while the test of the coefficients maintains the 
negative sign, but it is not statistically significant under this model. 
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With respect to the latter model (the same but without the country dummy) it is possible to 
see that the exclusion of the country dummy from the regression decreases the value of the R-
squared and increases the one of the Root MSE; the significance level of the time dummy 
remains unchanged while there is a change in the control variables where the GDP per capita 
and the unemployment rate regains their significance level at a 5% confidence level, the 
Gini_recession remains statistically significant and negative in sign and the test of the 
coefficients becomes again statistically significant under this model.  
The last model introduces two additional variables the “y” and the “y_r” that indicates 
country specific linear trend pre and post 2008; with the introduction of these variables there 
is the addition of country-specific linear splines. These splines are added in time with one 
single knot placed on the recession year (2008) and with their introduction it is possible to 
control the regression for potential country-specific break in trust; as we can see the value of 
the “Gini_recession” variable remains negative in sign (-1.60) and, above all, statistically 
significant ( P > |t| = 0.033) at a 5% confidence level. 
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In order to be more sure about the analysis, the same regressions were performed but utilizing 
the clustered adjusted standard errors in order to allow for dependence of the error terms 
within country and over time; for all the models proposed, with the only exception of the 
model with the interaction term but with the exclusion of the country dummy the normal 
standard errors are always lower than the standard errors adjusted for clusters and, 
consequenlty, it is possible to say that the actual model represents in a good way the 
relationship between the variables. 
3.5 FINDINGS 
As it possible to recap from the results presented above  all the model proposed has shown 
that the Gini index during the years of the recession is statistically significant and it is 
connected with the trust toward the European Union by a negative relationship; when the Gini 
index increases by 1% point there is a decrease in value in the trust toward the EU. As it is 
notable to see from the other models proposed the Gini index can’t be considered as the sole 
economic cause to the rise of populism in the Eurozone since, for example, there are time 
specific and counttry specific factors that need to be considered; additionally, with the 
introduction of the control variables and the interaction between them and the “recession” 
variable it is shown that other factors are relevant. Regarding these variables they change 
constantly their significance level and consequently it is difficult to say if they can explain the 
relationship in a certain way, for sure it can be said that the at-risk poverty rate remains not 
statistically significant (with and without the interaction with the recession) in all the models 
proposed while the GDP per capita and the unemployment rate were statistically significant in 
certain models and not in others, suggesting us that they had the potentiality to provide an 
interpretation to the decline of trust toward the EU but their continuous changes suggest that 
maybe the linear model is not suitable for them or maybe they are not the right variables for 
the models. What really matters though, is that the variable of interest of this study, that is the 
Gini index, remains statistically significant throughout all the models proposed and it explains 
the relationship the way it is expected from the hypothesis. 
3.6 LIMITATION 
Of course the models here proposed presents some important limitation of many nature; first 
of all, they were models constructed specifically in order to see the statistically significance of 
one single variable, the Gini index, where the other economic variables were added in order to 
substiante the argument; the model proposed was a model that considers only the effect of the 
economic variables in the relationship and furthermore only a few economic variables were 
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included, a factor that needs to be considered especially in a complex phenomen like the one 
of populism. 
As it was seen from the review of the literature that was done before the rise of populism is a 
complex multi-faced phenomenon that can’t be connected with just one single cause since its 
explanation can be found in economic variables as well as in cultural, social and political 
factors; the sole income inequality can’t be considered as the sole cause to the rise of 
populism but it can be said that it plays its part in explaining it. 
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CONCLUSION 
To sum up, populism is a phenomenon that has being seen its rising in the recent years and, 
consequently, the study of its causes, in order to have a greater understanding, is extremely 
important; as it was seen before the populism is a complex phenomenon that possesses 
different sides and that can’t be explained in a single way. 
The populism in the Eurozone may take the form of the Eurospecticism movement since, as it 
was said before, the European Union and its institutions play the role of the so called Elite 
that the populist movements propose to eradicate; by looking specifically at the data here 
proposed it is possible to say that the populism (which is measured through the trust toward 
the Euroepan Union proxy) may find one of its causes in the Gini index. This means that a 
greater level of income inequality within a country undermine the trust toward the European 
Union since it is considered as the sole legislator of the area, the institution that de-empowers 
the national governments and that threaten the wealth of the individuals creating room for 
populist parties to rise; this is converted into a fall of trust toward the European Union, the 
proxy here utilized in order to measure the potential causes to the rise of populism. 
As it was said before the rise of such complex phenomenon can’t be confined with just one 
single interpreation, there are many factors that play their role in such dynamics but for sure it 
can be said that a rising situation of income inequality in a country makes the people less 
secure about the role and the effectiveness of the European institution; besides its limitation 
this study can be considered as a starting point for future studies in order to provide a better 
insight of such phenomenon. 
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